THE FORMATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES.*
i.

THE DISTINCTION

BETWEEN INCORPORATION AN) LICENSING.

The formation of a new insurance company involves two
steps: First, the incorporation, or official recognition of a new
juristic person; and second, the authorization of the company
to engage in the business of making insurance contracts. The
incorporation endows the group with juristic personality, but
the powers of the juristic person are narrowly limited until it
obtains the state's privilege to engage in the business for which
it was formed. The first step is normally consummated by the
issuance of a certificate of incorporation; the second by the issuance of a license or certificate of authority to engage in the
insurance business."
The first step stands for state control over -group action
generally, 2 and is, of course, not peculiar to insurance corporations. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that in a number of
states the insurance commissioner is not given official power
over the incorporation of insurance companies, which takes
place in the same way as the formation of other companies; a
that is, the certificate of incorporation is issued independently
of the insurance commissioner, by the secretary of state or other
official who is empowered to issue such certificates for business
*This article forms part of a book on "The Insurance Commissioner in
the United States," which is now in press. Copyright 1925 by Edwin V. Patterson.
'See Jackson v. Mutual Fire Ins. Assn. of Ark., 154 Ark. 342, 242 S. W.
567 (1922), holding a mutual company, under the Ark. statutes, not bound by a
contract of insurance made after the certificate of incorporation, but before
the license, was issued. An express provision to this effect is found in Ala.
Civ. Code (1923) Sec. 8422.
'FREUND,

STANDARDS OF AMEIc.AN LfEGSLATION, 39-40.

'Ala. Civ. Code (1923) (other than mutual companies) ; Ark. (Kirby and
Castle's Digest, x915) ; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) (except Fraternal Societies) ;
Fla.

Comp. Laws (1914); Ga. (Code. 191o); Mo. Rev. Stats. (xigi)
Sec. 6439
(as to County Mutual companies) ; Nev. Rev. Laws (i912) Sec. i286; N. H.
Pub. Stats. (i9o) and Supp. (1913) ; N. J. Comp. Stats. (1910) p. 2840, Sees.
4, 5; N. M. Ann.. Stat. (19:5) Sec. 2825; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 192o) Sec.
9512: R. I. Gen. Laws (19o9) Ch. 212. Sec. 1o (special act of the legislature
in each case); S. C. Code of Laws (1912) Sec. 2834; Tenn. Ann. Code (Shannon, 1917) Sec. 2024 (Cf. Sec. 2259) ; Va. Codle Ann. (1919) Sec. 42ol.
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corporations generally. In a second group of states, though the
application for incorporation is made directly to the secretary of
state, and the certificate of incorporation is issued by him, the
enterprise must first be approved by the insurance commissioner
4
ixl certain particulars.
In a third and somewhat larger group of states, however, it
seems that the incorporation of insurance companies is treated
as sui gencris; the application is made directly to the insurance
commissioner, who acts independently of the secretary of state
(usually, however, subject to the approval of the attorney-general
as to the formal legality of the application) and takes both steps:
the incorporation and the authorization to do business.5 It is
difficult to generalize, since successive statutes have often provided different modes of incorporation for different kinds of
companies.8
'0el. Rev. Code (1915) Sec. 575; Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns, 1914) Sec. 4613
Me. Rev. Stat. (1916) Ch. 53, Sec. 63; Minn Gen. Stat. (i913) Sec. 3256; Mo.
Rev. Stat. (1919) Sec. 61o6; Mont. Rev. Code (1907) Sees 4043, 4077, 4413;
Pa. (Supp. to Purdon's Dig. [1923] vol. 8, "Insurance") See. io3 (com'r certifies approval to Governor); S. Dak. Rev. Code (1919) Sec. 9155; Vt. Gen.
Laws (1917) Sec. 5518 (com'r must certify that it "will promote the public
good of the stale"); Wash. Comp. Stat. (Remington, 1922) Sec. 7130; W.
Va. Code Ann. (Barnes, 1923). Ch. 23, Sec. 74.
'Ala. Civ. Code (1923) Sees. 8419 (mutual, other than life), 8458 (fraternal), 85io; Ariz. Civ. Code (1913) Sees. 3425, 3482; Colo. Laws 1915, p. 269;
Idaho Comp. Stat. (1919) Sec. 4942; 111. Rev. Stat. (Hurd, 1917) Ch. 73, Sec.
56; Iowa Comp. Code (I919) Sec. 5477; Ky. Stat. (Carroll, iiS) Sees. 66t,
619; La. Ann. Rev. Stat. (Marr, 1915) See. 3567 (here the Secretary of State is
ex officio insurance commissioner) ; Mich., Acts 1917, No. 256, II, 1, Sec. 4;
Miss. Ann. Code (Hemingway, 1917) Sec. 5043; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1913) Sec.
3218; N. Y. Cons. Laws (igog) Ch. 28, Sees. 1o, 70 (life), i1o (fire), Laws
1917, Cl. 155, Sec. i,Ch. 4, Sec. i; N. C. Rev. Laws (Pcll, 1908) Sec. 4727;
N. Dak. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913) Sec. 4839; Okla. Ann. Comp. Stat. (Bunn,
1921) Sec. 6667; Ore. Laws (Olson, 1.2o) Sec. 6365 (subject to approval of
Corporation Commission); Tex. Ann. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1914) Secs. 4705,
4707; Wis. Stat. (1921) Sec. 186; Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1920) See. 5243.
In nearly every case the approval of the charter by the Attorney General is required.

aE.g., under Fla. Laws (i9i5), Ch. 6850, the articles of association of a
mutual company are approved by the state treasurer (insurance commissioner)
and the legal existence of the corporation dates from his approval and filing

of such articles (Sec. 6).

See also Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919) Sec. 6439, which

provides for the incorporation of county nmutual companies by the circuit courts.
See Okla. Ann. Comp. Stat. (Bunn, 1921) Sec. 6926 (approval of mutual casualty company by Insurance Board); S. C. Code of Laws (1912) See. 2773

(mutual protectiie associations) ; S. Dak. Rev. Code (1919) Sec. 9266 (township mutuals formed by county auditor).
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The third form of administrative control seems preferable,
since the insurance commissioner can do the work (largely perfunctory) of incorporation as well as any other official, and is
thereby in a position to stop inimical enterprises at an earlier
stage than under the other two methods of control. Moreover,
if insurance companies are placed in a class by themselves, the
perplexing problems of correlating the insurance statutes with the
general incorporation laws will be avoided. 7 Finally, from the
standpoint of the incorporators themselves, it is more convenient
to have to deal with only one official than with two. The tendency
of recent legislation is to adopt this form of control.
While the two steps mentioned above are theoretically distinct, in practice it is often hard to draw the line, and to say when,
if ever, the corporation comes into existence (i. c., has the attributes of juristic "personality") before it is finally authorized to
engage in the insurance business. The statutes frequently fail
to make this clear. Thus, under the New York statute,8 it was
held that the "incorporators become a corporation before subscriptions to the capital stock are invited"; ' while under a very
similar statute in Missouri 10 the courts decided "there is no corporation until the amount of the proposed stock has been subscribed." 11 Probably under most statutes of similar wording,
12 the New York view would be preferred.
' Such questions constantly arise in the courts; e. g., Greiger v.Salzer, 63
Colo. 167, i65 Pac. 240 (917).
'Ins. Law of 1892, Sec. rio, which provides that upon filing the declaration of intention to incorporate and a copy of the charter and proof of publication of the intention, "such corporation, ifa stock corporation, may open
books for subscription to its capital stock. . . .
'Van Schaick v. Mackin, 129 App. Div. 335, 113 N. Y. Supp. 408 (19o8).
The court held that the general incorporation law therefore applied and invalidated a subscription to stock which was not accompanied by a cash payment of at least ten per cent.
°Mo. Rev. Stats. (igog) Sec. 6898 provides that after certain steps are
taken, the Secretary of State "shall issue a certificate of incorporation, upon
receipt of which they shall be a body politic and corporate and may proceed
to organize in the manner set forth in their charter and to open books for subscription to the capital stock . . . but it shall not be lawful for such conp"any to issue policies . . . until they have fully complied with the provisions of this article." (Italics ours.)
'Taylor v. St. Louis Nat'l. L. I. Co., 266 M1o. 2 3, 18i S. W. 8 (i915);
Reynolds v. Whittemore, i9o S.W. 594 (1916); Reynolds v. Title Guaranty
Trust Co., 196 Mo. App. 21, I89 S. V. 33, 37 (1916); Reynolds v. Union
Station Bank of St. Louis, 198 fo. App. 323, 200 S.W. 711 (1918). In these
cases the courts attained the same objects as in the New York case, namely, protected the enterprise against inimical stock subscription agreements.
'King v. Howeth & Co., 42 Okla. 178, 184 140 Pac. 1182 (1914), senible
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Some states have provided that the commissioner shall issue,
not a certificate of incorporation, but a license to the incorpo1 3 Where only this has been
rators to solicit stock subscriptions.
done, the incorporators have not yet attained juristic personality,14 and the two steps (incorporation mid authorization) become
coincident in point of time. This arrangement seems well adapted
to protect the public against unsound insurance enterprises.
2. DISCRETIONARY POWERS OF COMMISSIONER.

The statutes uniformly lay down pretty definite rules for the
formation of insurance companies 15 and hence most of the work
of the commissioner in this connection is routine or perfunctory.
Disputed questions of fact can seldom arise, and the application
of the statute to the facts will usually be simple and direct when
once the statute has been found and interpreted. For example,
an application was made to the commissioner for the incorporation of a company to guarantee payment of mortgage notes and
bonds, under the statute relating to the formation of surety coinpanies. The commissioner refused the application on the ground
that the casualty insurance statute was the one applicable to this
kind of business. The court granted a inandainus, saying that
the cc.mmissioner had no discretion as to which statute was applicable.1 6
In another case, the proposed articles of incorporation submitted to the commissioner did not contain the information called
v. Riggs,
(corporation in existence before stock subscribed). But see Blinn
in existence
n o Ill. App. 37, 49 (1903) under a similar statute (corporation
when capital stock subscribed though not paid in).
"Colo. Laws i915, 279; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) Sec. 4192 (as to fraternal
Sec.
societies) ; Ky. Stat. (Carroll, igis) Sec. 623; Ore. Laws (Olson, 1920)
6365 (3) ; ra. Code Ann. (igig) Sec. 4237.
Colo.
"'Greiger v. Salzer, 63 Colo. 167, I65 Pac. 240 (1917) construingcited
in
Rev. Stat. (i9o8) Sec. 317 which is similar to the Colorado Statute

the last note.
I'Except in Rhode Island, where the old practice of incorporating each
company by special statute still prevails. See supra, note 2.
"8People ex rcl. Gosling v. Potts, 264 Ill. 522, ro6 N. E. 524 (1914). That
concluis, the court simply disagreed with the commissioner and attached no
siveness to his determination.
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for by express statutory provision, as to "the time when and the
manner in which payment on stock subscribed shall be made";
nor as to "the mode in which the election of directors or managers shall be conducted," nor "the mode of liquidation at the
termination of the charter." In a malizdamus proceeding to compel the commissioner to issue a certificate of authority, it was
argued that these were "technical requirements"; but the court
refused the writ, pointing out that the non-compliance with the
statute was obvious on the face of the document submitted, and
adding that "The requirements of the statute cannot be disregarded as mere surplusage." '" The statute in this case is a
typical example of the sharply defined rules governing the commissioner's power to issue certificates of incorporation to newlyformed companies. Generally, the commissioner's duties under
such statutes are "ministerial."
Frequently, however, there are standards or principles which
the commissioner has to apply, and in the application thereof he
should be allowed discretionary power within limits. Thus, he
is frequently called upon to determine whether the capital stock
has been subscribed, or the assets invested, "in good faith," Is
and the court should uphold his decision unless an abuse of discretion appears,' 9 for the indicia of fraud can rarely be reproduced in a judicial record. An exceptional statute is the Vermont provision which requires the commissioner, before.
approving the formation of a new insurance company, to hold
a public hearing to determine whether the establishment of the
company "will promote the general good of the state." 20 Cer"' State rx rd. Lumberman's Accident Co. v. Michel,

124

La. 558, So So.

543 (1909).

14E. g., Idaho Comp. Stat. (9ig) Sec. 4942; Iowa Comp. Code (gig)
Sec. 5478; La. Ann. Rev. Stat. (Marr, 1915) Sec. 3582; Tex. Ann. Civ. Stat.
(Vernon, 1914) Sec. 4707; Va. Code Ann. (1919) See. 42o6; Wyo. Comp.
Stat. Ann. (1920) Sec. 5249. So, Ala. Civ. Code (1923) Se.. 8425 ("bona
fide" applications for incorporation of mutual companies).
'American Life Ins. Co. v Ferguson, 66 Ore. 417, 134 Pac. 1029 (1913)
(in determining whether a company has the "paid-up unimpaired capital" required by statute the commissioner "is given a wide discretion in safeguarding
the interest of the present and prospective stockholders and policyholders of
the company.")

"Vt. Gen. Laws (1917) Sec. 551&
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tificates of "public convenience." which are frequently required in
the formation of new banking enterprises, are not elsewhere
found in insurance legislation.
The permissible subjects of insurance are usually set forth
in detail in the statutes, and while the language is usually indefinite enough to permit minor innovations, new forms of insurance must await legislative authorization. A Nebraska statute,
however, apparently gives the insurance board unregulated discretion to extend indefinitely the legally permissible subjects of
insurance."
The commissioner's approval of the company's investments,
often provided for, will usually be construed to be governed by
the terms of the statutes prescribing the investments for going
concerns.2 -" Frequently the "approval" of the insnrance comissioner generally is required, or he is to approve, etc., if he finds
that "the laws of this state have been complied with." In either
event, his discretion is regulated by the other statutory provisions.
3.

INVESTIGATION BY THE COMMISSIONER.

The methods to be pursued by the commissioner in ascertaining whether or not the statutory requirements as to paid-up stock,
investments, etc., have been complied with, vary considerably.
One method is for the commissioner to take the affidavit of the
incorporators or directors to the effect that this has been done. 23
This method is apparently based on the naive notion that a man
who will violate the law will not foreswear himself. However
effective the oath may have been in the religious atmosphere of
2 Neb. Rev. Stat. (1913) Sec. 3218 provides that a company may be
formed to transact specified kinds of insurance or for any risk which is a
proper subject of insurance, not prohibited by law or contrary to sound public
policy, "to be determined by the insurance board." Cf. N. C. Rev. Laws (Gregory, Supp. 1913) Sec. 4726: "or against any other casualty . . . which is a
proper subject of insurance."
., The permissible investments are usually defined by the statute relating
to the particular type of company; e. g., fire, life, etc.
" Iowa Comp. Code (io9i)
Sec. 5479 (evidence in affidavit or otherwise
satisfactory) ; Md. Code (Bagby, igi') I. i8o (officers of company certify
under oath); Minn. Gen. Stat. (1913) Sec. 3313 (directors certify under
oath) ;-Ohio Gen. Code (Page. 192o) Sec. L522: Tex. Ann. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1914) Sec. 4708; Va. Code Ann. (igi9)
Secs. 4205, 4206; W.yo. Comp.
Stat. Ann. (xg2o) Sec. 5249.
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the Middle Ages, it is but a feeble substitute for direct official
supervision. A second method is for the commissioner to have
an examination made by one or more distinterested persons, competency or knowledge of the insurance business and of the wiles
of promoters not specified.2 4 This method apparently contemplates a sort of layman's examination, which is obviously inadequate. The third method is to have an examination made by
the commissioner himself or by one of his deputies or regular
examiners. This is the commonest method. 25 A few states leave
the method unspecified.20 Every insurance department should be
adequately equipped at least to examine the affairs of new companies and nip unsound enterprises in the bud. It is believed
that many of them are not.

4. LICENSE TO SELL STOCK IN INSURANCE COMPANY.
Coincident in time with the spread of the so-called "Blue
Sky" laws, there has been an increasing tendency to invest the
commissioner with drastlic powers of supervision over the sale
" Ill. Rev. Stat. (Hurd, 1917) Ch. 73, Sec. 56 (by commissioner in person
or by three disinterested persons who certify under oath); Nev. Rev. Laws
Cf. N. Y. Cons. Laws
(1912) Sec. 1290 (three disinterested residents).
(1909),

Ch. 28, Sec. zi

(examination by the commissioner or by one or more

competent and disinterested persons) ; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1920) Sec. 9522
(alternative methods) ;Tex. Ann. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1914) Sec. 4707 (same) ;
Wash. Comp. Stat. (Remington, 1922) Sec. 7038 (same); Wyo. Comp. Stat
Ann. (1920) Sec. 5249 (same).
"Idaho Comp. Stat. (1909) See. 4942; Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns, 1914) Sees.

4651, 4651a; Me. Rev. Stat. (t916) Ch. 53, Sec. 85; Md. Code (Bagby, 19x) I,
18o (in addition to the affidavit of the officers) ; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Mackintosh, 1915) Sec. 5191; Ky. Stat. (Carroll, xgi$) Sec. 621; Miss. Ann. Code
Sec. 6107; Mont. Rev.
(Hemingway, 1917) Sec. 5037; Mo. Rev. Stat. (9xg)
Code (Supp. i915) Sec. i78c; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1920) Sec. 5922 (alternative methods); Ore. Laws (Olson, 1920) Sec. 6365 (8); Pa. (Supp.
to Purdon's Dig. [1923] Vol. 8, "Insurance"), Sec. 107; Tex. Ann. Civ. Stat.
(Vernon, 1914) Sec. 4707 (alternative methods) ; Va. Code Ann. (1919) See.
4206; Wash. Comp. Stat. (Remington, 1922) Sec. 7038; Wis. Stat. (1921)
Sec. I897t; Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1920) Sec. 5249 (alternative method).
See also Vt. Gen. Laws (917) Sec. 5518 (public hearing).
'6Ala. Civ. Code (1923)

Sec. 8333; Iowa Comp. Code (i919) Sec. 5479;

Colo. Lws 1915, p. 279 ("shall by investigation satisfy himself"); La. Ann.
Rev. Stat. (Marr, 1915) Sec. 3582 ("satisfactory evidence"); N. H. Laws
(1913) Ch. 42, Secs. 1, 2 (same); N. Dak. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913) Sees.
4839. 4921; Okla. Ann. Comp. Stat. (Bunn,

(Olson.

192o)

I9v.)

Sec. 6326 (x) ; S. C. Code of Laws

Sec. 6674; Ore. Laws

(1912)

Sec. 2699; S.Dak.

Rev. Code (i919) Sec. 91x6; Tenn. Ann. Code (Shannon, 1917) Sec. 3277;
Utah Comp. Laws (1917) Sec. 1140; Vt. Gen. Laws (1917) Sec. 5521; W.
Va. Code Ann. (Barnes, 1923) Sees. ise, 74.
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of stock in insurance companies. Persons selling insurance stock,
or the companies themselves, or both, are required to obtain
licenses from the commissioner. The statutes in terms commonly
confer unregulated discretion upon the commissioner in the granting or revoking of these licenses. For example, he may refuse
a license unless he is "satisfied" or "finds" that "its operations
would be beneficial to the public," -- that "the business proposed
to be transacted within the state is proper and right," 28 that its
"plans and purposes" are "proper," ." that its "condition is satisfactory," 30 that the amount of securities is "reasonable," 3t that
the price at which the securities are to be sold is "adequate," 32
that the commissions and salaries to be paid are "fair." 13 A
Minnesota statute goes even further, providing that the license
of a stock-selling agent "shall be subject to revocation at any
time" by the commissioner "for cause appearing to him sufficient." 34 Literally construed, this gives the commissioner not
only unregulated but also (judicially) uncontrolled discretionary
power.35 It should therefore be declared unconstitutional unless
the selling of insurance stock is, like liquor-selling and other
forms of vice, 3 in the class of activities which may be absolutely
' Colo. Laws 1915, p. 279; Mo. Rev. Stats. (igig) Sec. 6370. It seems
these provisions are aimed to prevent fraud and are not the same as the "certificate of public convenience" referred to above.
I Ala. Civ. Code (x923) Sec. 4613; Mliss. Ann. Code (Hemingway, 1917)
Sec. 5149.
N. Y. Laws (9xg3)
Ch. 52 (McKinncmy Sec. 66); N. C. Rev. Laws
(Gregory, Supp., 1913) Sec. 482-Ia (4).
"Ibid. In Ga., a new domestic company "shall collect, hold, and disburse
its funds under such rules and regulations as insurance commissioner may
prescribe"--Park's Anno. Code, (1914) Vol. II, Sec. 2412J.
'Ibid. See also Va. Code Ann. (1919) Sec. 4237 ("for good cause").
Ibid.
* Ibid. In Colorado and Missouri, the statutes fix the percentage of commissions to be paid.
"Min. Gen. Stat. (1913) See. 3283. Cf. the N. Y. provision: may refuse
or revoke certificate "if, in his judgment, such refusal will best promote the
interest of the people of the state."
In Ayers v. Hatch, 175 Mass. 489, 56 N%. E. 612 (goo), "for such cause
as he shall deem sufficient" was said to repel the idea that removal of a public officer could be "at pleasure," but the court's inquiry into the cause was
perfunctory.

'Commonwealth v. Kinsley, 333 Mass. 578 (1882);
23 Neb. 371, 36 X. 1%% 554- (x888).

.Martin v. State,
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prohibited and which hence (by a dubious argument a fortiori
generally accepted by the courts) ,a may be tolerated on any
terms, however arbitrary, which the legislature may see fit to
impose.
Such a construction should be avoided. The grant of unregulated discretion in these cases is due to an ardent desire by
the lawmakers to put an end to the sale of bogus or watered
securities, coupled with the inability to lay down any standards
by which to measure the soundness of an enterprise. The statutes
are a striking example of legislative abdication in favor of the
administrative. There is recent and high authority for the view
that these grants of unregulated power will not be declared unconstitutional."' The solution therefore lies with the legislatures,
which should make a determined effort to substitute standards
of business ethics and business efficiency for the loose phrases
now employed.
5. SW

ILARITY OF CORPORATE,

NAMES.

An example of standardized discretionary power is found
in the provisions which declare that the name of a new insurance

company shall not be similar to the name of an existing insurance corporation."
These statutes exhibit considerable diversity
in phraseology; e.g.: "which is an interference with or too similar to one already appropriated"; " "so nearly resembling as to
' For examples of this type of judicial reasoning see Commonwealth v.

Kinsley, supra, note 36, and White. J., in Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan,
214 U. S. 320, 53 L. Ed. 1013, 1023 (1909).

' See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539 (1917); Lloyd v. Ram192 Iowa -xo3. 183 N. W. 333 (1921).
"Cal. Pol. Code (1907) Sec. 453e; Idaho Comp. Stat. (1919) Sec. 4938;
Iowa Comp. Code (i9'9) Sees. 551o, 56o and 5623; Ky. Stat. (Carroll, igis)
Sec. 722; Me. Rev. Stat. (1916) Ch. 53. Sec. 59; Mich. Acts 1917 No. 256.
II, x, Sec. 18; Mont. Rev. Code (i9o7) Sec. 4042; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1913) Sec.
3209; Nev. Rev. Laws (1912) Sec. 1311; N. J. Comp. Stats. (1910) p. 2839,
Sec. 3; N. M. Ann. Stat. (1915) Sec. 2847; N. Y. Cons. Laws (i.,og) Ch.
28. Sec. io; N. Dak. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913) Se.. 4837; Ohio Gen. Code
(Page. 1920) Sees. 9512. 9513, 9522, 9607 (23). 9341- 9349 (different wording as to each type of company) ; Okla. Ann. Comp. Stat. (Bunn, 192i) Sec.
6667; Ore. Laws (Olson, i92o) Sec. 6305 (i); Pa. (Supp. to Purdon's Dig.
11923] Vol. 8, "Insurance"). Sec. 96; Utah Comp. Laws (1917) Sec. 1138;
Wash. Comp. Stats. (Remington, 1922) Sec. 7130; Wis. Stat. (921) Sec.
1897b; Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (192o) Sec. 5243.
'Cal. Pol. Code (19o7) Sec. 609.
say,
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be calculated to deceive"; 41 "so similar as to be likely to mislead
the public or to cause inconvenience"; 42 "liable to be mistaken
by the public for the names of other corporations or in any way
cause confusion." " Such phrases as "an interference with" or
"too similar" and even "closely resembles" 44 call for a judgment
as to degree without indicating the grounds upon which that
judgment is to be exercised; and "to cause inconvenience" indicates too trivial a degree of *similarity. Such phrases as "likely
to mislead the public," or "calculated to deceive," 4- express the
standard about as clearly as may be done. On the other hand, it
seens unnecessary to give the commissioner unregulated power
in approving the name of a new company.
Fo.-tunately, the common law decisions on unfair competition
are aids in giving meaning to such statutory provisions. Thus.
it has been held that the statute does not prohibit the adoption
by a life insurance company of a name similar to one already
adopted by a company engaged only in fire insurance business.
it being shown that many such similarities exist and that in the
opinion of company officials they do not cause confusion or
uncertainty. 47 On the other hand, it should not be necessary to
'Idaho

Comp. Stat. (ig9g) Sec. 4938.

'Iowa Comp. Code (ig1)
Sec. _623. Cf. Ala. Civ. Code (1923) Scc.
8386 ("so similar . . . as in the opinion of the commissioner . . . is

calculated to result in confusion or deception"); Me. Rev. Stat. (1916) Ch.
53, Sec. 59 ("likely to mislead the public"); Mont. Rev. Code (19o7) Sec.
4042 (same); N. J. Comp. Stat. (igio) p. 2539,
Sec. 3 (same); Ohio Ga.
Code (Page,

i92o) Sees. 9512, 951.

' Ky. Stat. (Carroll, i915) Sec. 722. See also Ala. Civ. Code (i923)
Sec. 842o ("so similar as to be confusing or misleading"); Ohio Gen. Code
(Page, iOzo) Sec. 92z,
"'Mich. Acts 1917 No. 256, II, z, See. x8; Okla. Ann. Comp. Stat. (Bmn,
z921) Sec. 6667.

" N. Y. Coins. Laws (1909) Ch. 28, Se. io.
"As is done, for example, in Mass. Grin. Laws (I92i) Ch. 173, Sec. 49:
-The name oi the corporation shall be subject to approval by the insurance
commissioner . . ." (but see Mass. Gem Laws 11921] Ch. 155, Sec. 9:
company shall not "assume a name so similar thereto as to be likely to be mistaken for it.")
"Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Smith, 2 N. Y. Supp. 296 (1888)
(N. Y. Sup. Ct.). This decision ;s in line with such cases as Vassar
College
v. Loose-Wiles

Biscuit Co., 197 Fed. 982 (i912); but it seems too narrow in
the light of more recent holdings. See Aunt Jcmima Mills Co. v. Rigney &
Co.. 247 Fed. 407 (1917), and cases therein cited; OLPHAx, CASES ox T.DE
REGULoATIO, (1922) Ch. iv, Sec. 1.
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show, as in an action for damages, that some other company
will be directlv or substantially injured by the adoption of a
similar name, since the object of such regulation is to protect
not only the interests of other companies but primarily the inter4
ests of the public. "
The statutes are usually not broad enough to prevent similarity of the name of a domestic company to one adopted previously
by a o qration not as yet admitted to do business in the state.49
Thus, in 1919 , there were three separate companies in the United
States doing business under the nmine of "Liberty Life Insurance Company." "'I Even where the statute prohibits the adoption
of a niame similar to that of anty existing corporation,5a the commissioner, though lie may search the published lists of all insurance companies in existence for similar names before approving
a proposed name, 52 may not learn of the formation at about the
same time of a company with a similar name under the laws of
another state. Only a centralized registration bureau or centralized supervision would prevent such conflicts. The statutes are
frequently not broad enough to allow the refusal of authorization
to a foreign company because its name resembles that of a domestic company, and in the absence of statute the commissioner has
no power to make and apply such a regulation by analogy to the
statute covering the formation of domestic companies.5 3
The statut- s usually confer expressly upon the commissioner
the power to reject the name of a domestic company applying
"Both these elements are discussed without discrimination in Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Smith, supra, note 47.
'E. g., Idaho Comp. Stat. (1919) Sec. 4938 (same or similar to the name
of a company already author'zcd in this state); Mass. Gen. Laws (192!) Ch.
155, Sec. 9 (corporation carrying on business in Mass.); Mich. Acts 1917 No.

216, II, , Sec. iS ("any other corporation doing business in this state") ; Ohio
Gen. Code (Page,

192o)

See. 9341 (like Idaho).

Commissioner Savage of Iowa in Proceedings of the National Convention
of Insurance Commissioners (919)

p. 234.

" E. g.. Ala. Civ. Code (1923) Sec. 8420; M.ont. Rev. Code (I9O7) See.
4042; X. J. Comp. Stats. (igo) p. 2839. Sec. 3.
'Commissioner Savage suggested this method in his remarks cited in
note -o, and said he used it.
"ZPecple ex r. Traders' Ins. Co. of X. Y. v. Van Cleave, 183 Il. 330, 55
X. E. 698 (1899).
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for atthorization for the first time if it is "similar" to the nane
of an existing comIpany; ,4 vet sometimes the statute simply lays
down the norm without specifying who is to enforce it or how
It would seem clear that if the commissioner
that is to be done.
has power to disapprove the articles of incorporation, lie is impliedly given power to reject the articles of incorporation, or
to refuse a certificate of authority, until the misleading similarity
of name is removed by a change of name. To leave it to the
cuturts to enforce the provision by injunction or suit for damages
after the new company has commnenced business is to prefer
ex post facto justice to preventive justice. The deception should
be nipped in the bud. Yet it has been said that under such a
statute, the commissioner has no power to reject articles of
incorporation on this ground,o and held that at all events a
court may properly enjoin the formation of a competing enterprise which proposes to apply for incorporation under a name
similar to plaintiff's." The dictum seems clearly unsotund.'8 And
if the commissioner had power to refuse a certificate of incor"E. 9., Cal. Po. Code (I.o7) Sec. 609; Iowa Comp. Code (z919) Sees. 55i0
Se.
560!, 5523; Ky. Stats. (Carroll, 1915) Sec. 722; Mont. Rev. Code (90o7)
4042; N. M. Ann. Stat. (19i5) See. 2842; X. Dak. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913)

Scc. 4837; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, i92o) Sec. 9513 (cf. See. 951., conferring
same ?ower on attorney-general), Secs. 9-22. 96o7 (23), (mutual fire companies;
Superintendent and Secretary of State shall pass upon similarity of name; if
they disagree, attorney-general decides), Sec. 9349 (may withhold license);
Okla. Ann. Comp. StaL (Bunn, 192i) Sec. 66;7; Pa. (Supp. to Purdon's Dig.
[I1923] Vol. 8, "Insurance'*), Sec. 96 (Commissioner may prohibit) ; W\yo. Comp.
Stat. Ann. (192o) Sec. 5243.
'SE. g.. Ala. Civ. Code (1923) Sec. 84--o: .ich Acts 1917, No. 256, II, T,
Sec. 18: "No company formned under this act shall assume any name which is tile
same as or closely resembles the name of any other corporation doing business in
this state." See also S. Dak. Rev. Code (1919) Sec. 9154. In Utah, R. I. and
Tenn., it seems the commissioner has no -ower over similarity of name. In others
(Ala., Ore., Tex., Vt., Wash.) his power must be derived by implication from
general powers of disapproval.
"Modern Woodmer, of America v. Hatfield, 199 Fed. 270, 275 (1912).
5t

Ibid.

The Kansas statute required the organizers (of a fraternal society) to file
with the Superintendent of Insurance a certificate stating, among other things,
"proposed corporate name of the association which shall not too closely resemble
the nanie of any similar association." The Superintendent was to issue a certificate of his approval "in case (lie) shall find that its (the organizers' certificates)
provisions are in accordance with Section i of this Act," which apparently referred to the requirements above mentioned. The problem was therefore the
same as that raised by many other statutes where similarity of name is forbidden, but no express power is given the commiSsioner to reject the articles on that
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poration or of authority on the ground of similarity of name, it
would seem that the decision, likewise, was wrong, because, conceding that the commissioner's decision would not be conclusive
against judicial attack, the plaintiff should have been required to
exhaust his administrative remedies before resorting to a judicial
proceeding. 9
Whether or not the action of the commissioner, or other
official, in approving a particular name should be conclusive
against subsequent judicial attack, is another question. It would
be advantageous to have the question of similarity of name
settled once and for all by the granting of the certificate of incorporation. The corporation would then be assured that an established business would not be upset by a subsequent judicial decision that its name "resembled" too closely that of an existing
corporation. The commissioner, it would seem, is quite as able
to decide these questions of degree as is a judge; moreover, he
has on file the names of all existing corporations doing business
in tbe commonwealth. On the other hand, such conclusiveness
would be disadvantageous to corporations already doing business
in the state. How could the procedural safeguards be made adequate to secure a fair and full hearing of all interferences in
name? The obvious analogy of patents and trade-marks supports
the view that the commissioner's decision on a corporate namne
should not be conclusive against collateral attack in a suit by a
corporation affected.
This problem has had an interesting history in Massachusetts. In a petition for leave to file an information in the
nature of quo -warrantoand to restrain the use of a corporate
name by defendant corporation, the plaintiff alleged prior user
of the name and resulting confusion and injury, actual or prosground. Unles, such power is to be implied. the prohibition is meaningless. See
also People ex reL Felter v. Rose, 225 Ill.
496, So X. E. -93 (g9o7), (Mandamus
to compel issuance of certificate of incorporation denied on ground of similarity
of name).
Plaintiff alleged that defendants were about to apply to the Superintendent

for authority to do business under a similar name.

The administrative official

(Superintendent of Insurance) had thus never been given an opportunity to act.
On the general principle that administrative remedies must first be exhausted

before resort to judicial proceedings, see Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.
S. 210 (19o8) : Mellon v. McCafferty, 239 U. S. i34 (z9iS).
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pective. The defendant was incorporated under a statute which
merely prohibited the use of a name "in use by any existing
corporation." eo A later section provided that the issuance of a
certificate of incorporation "shall . . be conclusive evidence
of the organization and establishment of such corporation." "1
The court denied the petition, chiefly on the ground that the issuance of the certificate of incorporation was conclusive on the
question of similarity of -name.'* While the court confined itself
to holding that plaintiff could not invoke the remedy, quo warranto, the decision was interpreted in a later case as holding that
the issuance of the certificate of authority was conclusive in a
suit in equity by a previously existing corporation against one
organized with a similar name. ' 3 There the plaintiff, as in the
Kansas case,64 brought suit before the commissioner 'of insurance had passed upon defendant's application for a certificate
of incorporation, and made the commissioner and the Secretary
of State parties defendant. Mr. Justice Holmes, who wrote the
opinion, saw the analogy of the patent law:
"Of course, the right of the defendants to use the name
might be left subject to revision upon a private suit, notwithstanding the issue of the charter, after the analogy of
patents. The question is one of construction, and the language of the statute is not entirely conclusive. But practically the construction is settled by Boston Rubber Shoe Co.
v. Boston Rubber Co., x49 Mass. 436." 6
In support of this construction, he adduced the analogy of
a trade-name acquired under a patent, after the patent has expired:
'It (plaintiff) received its name in the first instance as
a corporate name under the statute, subject as such to what",Mass. Laws 18;0, Ch. 224 See. 8: same as .Mass. Pub. Stats. (1882), Ch.
io6, Sec. &
I Ibd., Sec. it.
Boston Rubber Shoe Co. v. Boston Rubber Co., 149 Mass. 436, 21 N. E.
875 (1889).
" American Order of Scottish Clans v. Merrill. 15! Mass. 558, 24 N. E,98
(1&)o).
Supra, note 56.
i1 Mass. at p. 56o.
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ever interference by subsequent corporations might be permitted under the statute. The name remained subject to the
same degree of interference, whatever importance it might
acquire in a business way. The principle is somewhat like
that upon which patentees have been denied the exclusive
right to the nanues of their patented articles as trade-marks
after their patents have expired. The degree of protection
to which the plaintiff is entitled is measured by the rights
which the statute confers on it. The limit is marked by the
adjudication of the insurance commissioner." 08
Vhile constitutional questions were not discussed, the reasoning
quoted would strongly support the validity of a statute making
the issuance of the certificate of incorporation conclusive as to
similarity of name, at least against collateral attack, as here.
However, this construction of the statute was overturned in
the following year by a statute which declared that the action
Of any board, commissioner or officer of the commonwealth in
approval of a certificate of incorporation should be subject to
• revision" by "the Supreme Court or the Superior Court in a
suit in equity brought by any corporation affected thereby, to
enjoin a corporation organized with a similar name from doing
business under such name." 87 This statute has been carried forward without substantial modification into the latest revision. 8
It is expressly made applicable to insurance companies. 0 9 On the
whole balancing of the conflicting interests involved, it is believed these later statutes represent a sounder view than the
judicial decisions. The test of similarity of name is empirical:
Does or will the similarity actually lead to confusion and cause
injury to the business of the prior user? To pass upon this
question in advance of actual user, as the commissioner has to
do in passing upon the proposed name of a corporation which
has not yet done business, is a much more conjectural process
" 151 Mass. at p. 562.
" Mass. Laws 189i, Ch. 257, See. x (relates solely to this point).
' Mass. Gen. Laws (192i) Ch. 1.5, Sec. 9.
" Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) Ch. 175. See. 49.
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than the determination of the same question by a court after the
newer corporation has done business a substantial length of time.
The interests involved are too weighty for snap judgment. However, the officials having approval powers may prevent litigation
by resolving all doubts in favor of the prior appropriator of a
70
somewhat similar name.
Edwin W1.Patterson.
Columbia University Law School.
" See Weekly Underwriter Rulings, Ill. 1 (1923), a ruling by the AttorneyGeneral, relying upon People v. Rose, supra, note 58, that lie had implied power
to reject the proposed name of an insurance company because of similarity to
that of an existing company, and refusing to approve the proposed name, "Illinois National Life Insurance Company," because there were already in existence
two domestic companies, one named "National Life Insurance Company of the
United States," the other called "Chicago National Life Insurance Company."

